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(IN)vISIBLE INEQUALITIES:
WOMEN, TAx AND POVERTY
Claire F.L. Young*
L'impact de la Loi de l'impbt sur le revenu sur
les femmes a ata le point central de deux
contestationsenvertude larticle 15de la Charte
qui ont 6tM entendues racemment par la Cour
suprarme du Canada. Dans l'arrat Symes c.
Canada, la majorita desjuges a statug que la
non-daductibilita desfrais de garde d'enfants t
titre de dapense d'entreprise ne constituait pas
une discrimination fondge sur le sexe. Dans
l'arrat Thibaudeau c. Canada, la majoritg a
conclu que l'obligation d'inclure dans le calcul
du revenu les sommes regues t titre depension
alimentaire pour l'entretien des enfants ne
constituaitpas unediscriminationfondiesur la
situation defamille. ltant donn qu'on utilise le
ragime fiscal pour distribuer les subventions
accordaespardenombreuxprogrammessociaux
et aconomiques, l'accas des femmes et des
minoritas h ces subventions est une question
fondamentaledonton doittenircomptelorsqu 'on
atudie l'aquita du ragime.
Cet article examine l'impact du rigime
fiscal sur lesfemmes et damontre que le ragime
fiscal comporte de multiples exemples de
traitement inagal desfemmes par rapport aux
hommes. Bien que l'auteure reconnaisse que
touteformedecategorisation estproblmatique,
elle se concentre sur les inagalitas auxquelles
fontface quatregroupes defemmes: lesfemmes
pauvres, lesfemmes dgges, les lesbiennes et les
mares. A la lumiare des arrats Symes et
Thibaudeau, l'auteure atudie l'efficacita de la
Charteen tant qu 'outilpermettantd'aliminerles
inagalitas. En outre, elle conclut que mime si le
ragime fiscal est modifi, il sepeut quil ne soit
jamais un outil efficace pour appliquer les
programmes sociaux de maniare aquitable.
Enfin, il pourrait bien itre temps de laisser
tomber la stratagie qui se fonde sur les
contestations pour aliminer les inagalitas, et
d'adopter une approche qui se concentre
davantage sur le domainepolitique.
The issue of the impact of the Income Tax Act
on women has been the focus of two recent
section 15 Charter challenges heard by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In Symes v. Canada
the majority of the Court found that the non-
deductibility as a business expense of child
care expenses was not discriminatory on the
basis of sex and in Thibaudeau v. Canada the
majority held that the requirement that child
support payments be included in income did
not discriminate on the basis offamily status.
Given that the tax system is used to deliver
financial subsidies for many social and
economic programs, access to those subsidies
by women and minorities is a key issue in
considering the fairness of the system.
This article examines the impact ofthe tax
system on women and demonstrates that the tax
system is replete with examples of unequal
treatment of women compared to men. While
recognising that any form of categorisation is
problematic, the authorfocuses the inequalities
faced by four groups of women; poor women,
elderly women, lesbians and mothers. In light
ofSymes andThibaudeau, the authorconsiders
the effectiveness of the Charter as a tool by
which to redress these inequalities anddiscusses
why a Charter challenge is unlikely to succeed.
Further, the author concludes that even if
changes are made to the tax system, it may
never be an effective tool by which to deliver
social programs in a fair manner. It may be
time to shift the focus from a litigation based
strategy to redress the inequalities discussed in
the article to an approach thatfocuses more on
the political sphere.
* Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. I am especially indebted to Lisa Philipps for her
insightful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Kristin Graver forher excellentresearch assistance, Susan
Boyd and Katherine Hardie for their comments on aspects of this article, and to the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council for research funding provided by way of a strategic grant under the Women and
Change Program.
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Women, Tax and Poverty
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1995 federal budgetproposes massive spending cuts to federal programs in the
name of deficit reduction. The spending cuts will be achieved by an initiative termed the
Program Review which will reduce federal spending by $9.5 billion in the next three
years,' and by drastic reductions in the amounts transferred to the provinces.2 It is clear
thatmany social programs will be affected As one considers thispolicy andthe impact
of these cuts, one must not forget the role that the tax system4 plays as a funding
mechanism for aspects of many social programs. Indeed as I shall demonstrate, the tax
system is a powerful social and economic tool that is used to deliver financial subsidies
for many activities and programs.' It is critical at this time, therefore, to review and
consider carefully the impact our tax system has on various groups in Canadian society.
In so doing we must evaluate its impact on the particular group and determine if the
system treats that group fairly6 and if not, why not.
In this article I examine the impact of the tax system on women7 and conclude that
such an exercise is truly a study in inequalities. Unfortunately, these inequalities have
not yet been found to be discriminatory under section 15 the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms' by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Symes v. Canada9 the majority of the
See Canada, House of Commons, Budget Plan (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 27 February
1995) at 7.
2 The proposal is to introduce the Canada Health, Education and Social Transfer to replace the
Established Programs Financing and the Canada Assistance Plan which will result in a move from cost-
sharing with the provinces to block funding for programs in the areas ofprovincial responsibility such
as child care.
3 Forexample, underProgram Review, Human Resources Development Canada, the department
which administers, among other items, unemployment insurance, income security programs for
children and the elderly, labour market adjustment and social development programs, will see its
budget reducedby $885 million overthenextthreeyears, areduction of 34.8 percent. SeeBudgetPlan,
supra note I at 36 and 111.
4 Although my primary focus is on the income tax system, I use the term "tax system" rather
than "income tax system" because the former term is broader and includes taxes such as the Goods and
Services Tax. It also incorporates the concept of the exclusion from taxation of some forms of wealth
because Canada does not levy a personal wealth tax such as an annual wealth tax, an estate tax or
succession duties.
I A recent example is the introduction of the child tax benefit in 1993. S. 122.6 ofthe Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5 [hereinafter the Act] replaces the family allowance for children, an item
previously delivered by way of a direct grant. Other examples include the numerous tax subsidies for
business, including, for example, the small business deduction (s. 125) and the manufacturing and
processing profits deduction (s. 125.1).
6 Fairness is a concept that is discussed in more detail, see pp. 103-04, below.
7 Women are, of course, not a monolithic group and it is equally important to consider how the
tax system affects different groups of women. While my focus in this article is on the impact of the tax
system on women generally, I shall also demonstrate what impact factors such as class, age and sexual
orientation have on the way the tax system affects women.
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter]. S. 15 reads in part:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection
and equal benefit ofthe lawwithout discrimination and in particular, without discrimination
based on race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical
disability.
9 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 470, [1994] 1 C.T.C. 40 [hereinafter Symes cited to
C.T.C.].
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Supreme Court found that the non-deductibility as a business expense of child care
expenses was not discriminatory and in Thibaudeau v. Canada (M.N.R.)0 the majority
foundthatthe requirementthat child supportpayments be included in custodial parents'
income was also not discriminatory. But, as we see in those cases, the non-recognition
by the Supreme Court of women's inequality under the tax system as discrimination is
itself a highly gendered phenomenon. The discrimination suffered by Elizabeth Symes
and Suzanne Thibaudeau is clearly visible to both the women judges on the Court, while
being invisible to all the male judges on the Court." My primary focus in this article is
the impact ofthe tax system on women and I demonstrate that the system is replete with
examples of unequal treatment. The inequalities are particularly evident when one
examines access to tax subsidies. In light of the two recent Supreme Court of Canada
cases mentioned above, I also consider the issue of the potential of the Charter as a tool
to remedy this unequal treatment. My conclusion is that there is little to be optomistic
about concerning the potential for success of future Charter challenges to the Act on the
basis of sex discrimination. A more fruitful approach may well be to redirect our
attention to the political sphere in an effort to redress the inequalities that I discuss in this
article.
Our tax system is not just about revenue raising. It is in fact a massive spending
program and should be evaluated as such. Tax expenditure analysis theory tells us that
any measures such as income exclusions, deductions, deferrals or tax credits which
depart from the "normative tax system" are tax expenditures. 2 That is, rather than
delivering a subsidy for a particular activity or endeavor by way of, for example, a direct
grant, the government delivers the subsidy through the tax system. While there are
ongoing debates about how one defines the normative or benchmark structure ofthe tax
system, which lead to issues about whether a particular item is a tax expenditure or not,
these debates do not, in my opinion, detract from the value of tax expenditure analysis
as a tool of evaluation. 3 Furthermore, the publication by the federal government of tax
expenditure accounts and the acknowledgment that tax expenditure analysis plays a role
in the budget process indicate its validity as a method of analysis.' 4 Proponents of tax
1O [1995]2 S.C.R. 627,[1995] S.C.J.No.42 (QL) [hereinafter Thibaudeau], affg (1994), D.L.R.
(4th) 261 (F.C.A.), 2 C.T.C. 4 [hereinafter Thibaudeau (F.C.A.) cited to C.T.C.], rev'g 92 D.T.C.
2111 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Thibaudeau (T.C.C.)].
11 In Symes, the majority ofthe court, consisting ofJustices Lamer, LaForest, Gonthier, Sopinka,
Cory, lacobucci, and Major, found there was no discrimination on the basis of sex and in Thibaudeau
the majority ofthe court, consisting ofJustices La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and Iacobucci, held
that there was no discrimination against separated or divorced custodial parents. In both cases the only
women on the Court, Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin, heldthatthe tax provisions contravened
s. 15 of the Charter and were discriminatory.
1 Tax Expenditure Analysis was first introduced as a concept by Stanley Surrey in Pathways to
Tax Reform (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1973). Since thattime much has been written
on the issue. One excellent Canadian collection of articles is N. Bruce, ed., Tax Expenditures and
Government Policy (Kingston, Ontario: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy,
Queens University, 1988). A "normative tax system" consists of the basic structural features of the
current income tax system. According to the Department of Finance it includes "the existing tax rates
and brackets, unit oftaxation, time-frame oftaxation, treatment ofinflation for calculating income and
those measures designed to reduce or eliminate double taxation". See Canada, Department of Finance,
Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures, (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1993) at 4.
13 Bruce, ibid.
"4 Tax expenditure accounts were released in 1979, 1980, 1985, 1992 and 1993. See Canada,
Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures Account: A Conceptual Analysis and Account of Tax
[Vol. 27:1
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expenditure analysis argue that its value stems from the fact that it allows one to quantify
spending programs that are "hidden" in the tax system. For example, in 1991 the federal
government spent $210 million subsidising certain health care expenses through the tax
credit for medical expenses." The proponents of tax policy analysis would also argue
that when such a program is evaluated it should be done by reference to budgetary
criteria such as the target effectiveness of the subsidy and its cost efficiency, as well as
by reference to traditional tax policy criteria. I would take tax expenditure analysis one
step further and suggest that it allows us to focus on a new, broader range ofissues which
are fundamentally related to the concept offairess. Such issues include a consideration
of how funds expended through the tax system are allocated. Who benefits from these
expenditures? And, perhaps more importantly, who does not benefit from them? 6
What is considered to be fairness in taxation is, like beauty, very much in the eye
of the beholder.' 7 Traditional tax policy analysis has judged the effect of tax measures
and, to a certain degree, their fairness, by reference to factors such as horizontal and
vertical equity, neutrality and economic efficiency and administrative simplicity.'8
Underpinning these criteria have been the normative values ofincome taxation based on
ability to pay andtaxation as atool ofincome redistribution. But, as feminists have noted,
traditional tax policy analysis omits a very important element, that is equality among
particular groups in society.'9 Thereforemy focus in this article is on the broader concept
of (in)equality, rather than the concept of equity as it has traditionally been applied in
tax policy debates.
Traditional tax policy analysis defines horizontal equity as the requirement that
equals be treated equally and vertical equity as the treatment of persons in differing
situations in appropriately differing ways. The limitations of analysis by reference to
Preferences in the Federal Income Tax and Commodity Tax Systems (Ottawa: Department ofFinance,
1979); Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditure Account: An Account of Tax Preferences in
Federal Income and Commodity Tax Systems, 1976-1980 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1980);
Canada, Department of Finance, Account of the Cost of Selective Tax Measures, (Ottawa: Supply &
Services Canada, 1985); Canada, Department of Finance, Personal Income Tax Expenditures,
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1992) and Canada, Department'of Finance, Personaland Corporate
Icome Tax Expenditures, supra, note 12. See also S. Poddar, "Integration of Tax Expenditures into
the Expenditure Management System: The Canadian Experience" in Bruce, supra note 12; and, E.
Lindquist, "Improving the Scrutiny of Tax Expenditures in Ontario: Comparative Perspectives and
Recommendations" in A. M. Maslove, ed., Taxing and Spending: Issues of Process (Toronto:
University ofToronto Press, 1994) 32 where the important role that tax expenditure analysis has played
in the federal government's policy making is discussed in detail.
S 5. 118.2 of the Act provides a non refundable tax credit for certain medical expenses.
16I am not suggesting that analysis based on the traditional tax policy criteria preclude
consideration of issues such as fairness and equity. But it is apparent that this analysis has not focused
in the past on an examination of group inequality.
17 For a discussion of the public perceptions about what constitutes fairness in the tax system,
see Ontario FairTax Commission, Fair Taxation in a Changing World (Toronto: University ofToronto
Press, 1993) and in particular the discussion at 44-68.
18 For an in-depth analysis of the various meanings ascribed to the concept of fairness, see A.
Maslove, ed., Fairness in Taxation: Exploring the Principles (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1993) [hereinafter Fairness in Taxation].
19 The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women first noted this omission. See
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Women and Income Tax Reform (Background
Paper) by M. Maloney (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1987) at 2.
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these definitions of equity are many and have been discussed elsewhere. 0 Maureen
Maloney has pointed out that "[w]hile current interpretations of equity, both vertical and
horizontal, may catch class biases, they do not go far enough because the need for equity
is generally recognized with respect only to the distribution of income, and even then
with very limited effect."'" Evaluation of the tax system by reference to equality is not
as limited in scope. It requires an examination of the impact of the provisions of the Act
on particular groups in society to determine if they are treated in a prejudicial manner.
Therefore factors such as gender, sexual orientation, race, disability and other aspects
of social identity must be taken into account in evaluating the fairness ofthe tax system.
There is a second aspect to this issue. This analysis must take into account that equality
does not merely mean formal equality, but must also encompass the concept of
substantive equality. An approach based on formal equality would treat all individuals
in the same manner, regardless of the differences between them. It has been said that it
"is inadequate to the task of creating real equality because it does not encompass or even
acknowledge inequality of condition".' Substantive equality recognises that in order to
achieve equality, different groups in society may require different treatment. 3 An
example of formal equality in the tax context is the gender neutrality of the Act. Each
provision applies to both men and women and yet, as I shall discuss, women suffer
significant inequalities when compared to men in terms of the application of the tax
system.
Feminist work on tax policy issues affecting women has covered a wide range of
issues. For example the issue ofwhether the tax unit should be the individual or whether
the tax system should recognise certain relationships and, for instance, tax spouses as
one unit has been the focus of much of the literature. 4 Other issues have included the
non-taxation of imputed income,2 the effect of the 1987 tax reform on women, the
20 See e.g. R.W. Boadway and H.M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1984) at 7-15.
21 M. Maloney, "What is the Appropriate Tax Unit?" in A.M. Maslove ed.,Issues in the Taxation
of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 116 at 118.
22 G. Brodsky and S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rightsfor Women: One Step Forward or
Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women,1989) at 150.
23 Mclntyre J. quoted Dickson C.J. fromR. v. BigMDrugMart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 347
inAndrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 165 when discussing the
example of religious freedom:
In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment. McIntyre
J. then continued:
In simple terms, then, itmay be said that a law which treats all identically and which provides
equality oftreatment between "A" and "B" might well cause inequality for "C", depending
on the differences in personal characteristics and situtations. To approach the ideal of full
equality before and under the law - and in human affairs an approach is all that can be
expected-the main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or group
concerned. [emphasis added]
24 See e.g. L. Dulude, "Joint Taxation of Spouses- A Feminist View" (1979) 1:4 Can. Tax'n:
J. Tax Pol'y 8; K. Lahey, "The Tax Unit in Income Tax Theory" in E.D. Pask, K.E. Mahoney & C.A.
Brown, eds., Women, the Law and the Economy (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) 277; L. Dulude,
"Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American, British, French and Swedish Law"
(1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 67; and Maloney, supra note 21.
1 Imputed income from household production is primarily the value of women's unpaid labour
in the home. Such labour is considered to be "earned income in kind" and the theory is that ignoring
its value for tax purposes means that those women who work outside the home in the paid labour force
[Vol. 27:1
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potential application ofthe Charterto theAct, the interrelationship oftax and family law
and othertax policy issuesthataffectwomen. 26 More recently, the Symes and Thibaudeau
litigation have generated considerable feminist Work on the issues raised in the cases.27
I shall focus on the inequalities faced by four groups of women; poor women, elderly
women, lesbians and mothers. It is important to realise, however, that any form of
categorisation in this manner is problematic. In an attempt to discuss the issues in a clear
manner, women's oppression becomes reduced to a series of discrete examples.28 In
reality, life is not about fitting neatly into one particular category and indeed many
women may fall into more than one of the categories I use. Consequently the picture is
often more complex than the one that is illustrated by my four examples. Nevertheless,
such an approach is a starting point for consideration of the inequitable application of
the tax system to women. Furthermore, there is one theme in particularthat runs through
my entire article; that is poverty. Poverty is exacerbated, in many cases, by the lack of
access to certain tax subsidies or the inadequacy of their amount. Concurrently, the tax
system discriminates in many ways against those who are already poor. I now turn to the
inequalities faced by these women.
II. INEQUALITIES FACED By FOUR GROUPS OF WOMEN
A. Women as the Poor
Women tend to eam less than men. In 1992, women with full time paid jobs earned
only 71.8 per cent of vhat men earned.29 In 1991, the average female-headed family had
are at a disadvantage as they have to purchase those household services or forego leisure time in order
to provide them for themselves and their families.
26 See e.g. M. Maloney, "Women and the Income Tax Act: Marriage, Motherhood and Divorce"
(1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 182; L. Dulude, "Tax and Family Laws: A Search for Consistency in Family Law
in Canada" in E. Sloss, ed., Family Law in Canada: New Directions (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, 1985) 63; Women andIncome Tax Reform, supra note 19; National
Association ofWomen and the Law, Women and TaxPolicy (Ottawa: National Association ofWomen
andthe Law, 1991 ); F. Woodman, "The Charter and the Taxation of Women" (1990) 22 Ottawa L. Rev.
625; B. Kitchen, "The Patriarchal Bias ofthe Income Tax in Canada" (1986) 11 Atlantis 35; L. Philipps,
Taxing Inherited Wealth: Ideologies About Property and the Family in Canada (LL.M Thesis, York
University, 1992).
27 See e.g. C.F.L. Young, "Child Care - A Taxing Issue?" (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 539
[hereinafter "Child Care -A Taxing Issue"]; C.F.L. Young, "Child Care and the Charter: Privileging
the Privileged" (1994) 2 Rev. Con. Studies 20; F. Woodman, "The Charterandthe Taxation of Women"
(1990) 22 OttawaL. Rev. 625; C.F.L. Young, "Symes v. The Queen" (1991) British Tax Rev. 105; A.
Macklin, "Symes v. MNR: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992) 5 C.J.W.L. 498; D.M. Eansor and C.
Wydzynski, "Troubled Waters: Deductibility of Business Expenses underthe Income Tax Act, Child
Care Expenses andSymes" (1993) 11 Can. J. Fain. L. 249; E. Zweibel andR. Shillington, ChildSupport
Policy: Income Tax Treatment and Child Support Guidelines (Toronto: The Policy Research Centre
on Children, Youth and Families, 1993); E. Zweibel, "Child Support Policy and Child Support
Guidelines: Broadening the Agenda" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 371 [hereinafter "Broadening the Agenda"];
E. Zweibel, "Thibaudeau v. R: Constitutional Challenge to the Taxation of Child Support Payments"
(1993/94) N.J.C.L. 305 [hereinafter "Constitutional Challenge"]; L. Philipps and M. Young, "Sex, Tax
and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada" (1995) 2 Rev. Con. Studies 221.
28 For a discussion of this issue in the context of the Charter, see N. Iyer, "Categorical Denials:
Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179.
29 Women earned on average $28,350 and men $39,468. See Statistics Canada, The Daily (17
January 1994) 2.
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an income that was less than halfthat ofthe average male-headed family.3" While women
form the majority of the poor in Canada, it is single mothers and their children who are
the poorest of the poor: 37.6 per cent of unattached women under 65 live below the
poverty line, and on average, their income is $6,265 below the poverty line; 58.4 per cent
of single mothers with children under the age of 18 live below the poverty line, and on
average, they live $8,538 below that line, farther than any other group.3' The National
Council of Welfare has observed that there is "guaranteed poverty for large numbers of
Canadian women at some point in theirlives."321 I contendthatthe tax system exacerbates
the problem of women's poverty by making tax expenditures, which are apparently
gender neutral in their application, either unavailable or inadequate in amount to many
women by reason of their poverty.
To the extent that the tax system provides subsidies by way of deductions in the
computation ofincome ratherthan as credits fortax payable, it discriminates against low
income taxpayers.33 This is because the value of a deduction is tied to the rate at which
the taxpayer is taxed. In other words, a deduction is worth more in terms of tax dollars
saved to the taxpayer who pays tax at a high rate than it is to the one who has less income
andpays tax at a lowerrate. If, forexample, ataxpayeris entitledto a deduction of$5000
for child care expenses, that deduction is worth $2500 in tax dollars saved if she pays
tax at a combined federal/provincial rate of 50 per cent but it is only worth $1000 to the
low income taxpayer who pays tax at a rate of 20 per cent. A tax credit, by contrast, is
generally worth the same amount of money to all taxpayers with taxable income. Tax
subsidies delivered as deductions include, for example, deductions for child care
expenses, moving expenses, union dues, contributions to registered pension plans and
registered retirement savings plans, business expenses and, in some instances, capital
gains.
Any decrease in the progressivity of the tax system also impacts adversely on the
poor. In 1987, Canada experienced its most recent "tax reform". At that time the number
of tax rates was reduced from ten to three and the top federal rate reduced from 34 per
cent to 29 per cent. The result of this change was a reduction in the progressivity of the
tax system. Progressivity is the hallmark of taxation based on ability to pay. It rightly
recognises that those with greater incomes should pay a greater proportion of that
income as tax than those with lower incomes. Even though we have seen an increase in
the top rates because of the introduction of surtaxes, the system is not as progressive as
it was prior to the 1987 tax reform. 34 In addition, the introduction of the Goods and
Services Tax (GST), a flat rate consumption tax, has meant a further decrease in the
30 The figures were $49,812 for male headed families and $23,812 for female headed families.
Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size in Canada 1991 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science
and Technology, December 1992).
1 National Council of Welfare, PovertyProfile 1992 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1994)
at 45 and 70.
32 National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited (Ottawa: Supply & Services
Canada, Summer 1990) at 3.
33 In this article I use the term "discriminate" to refer to the unequal treatment of women by the
tax system, regardless of whether that treatment has or has not been held to be discriminatory within
the meaning of the Charter or Human Rights legislation.
34 Indeed, the income tax rate structure has been steadily becoming less progressive. The earlier
majortax reform, in 1972, saw a reduction in the numberoftax rates from fourteen to ten and a lowering
of the top federal rate to 47 per cent.
[Vol. 27:1
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progressivity of the tax system.35 Flat rate taxes such as the GST, property taxes, sales
taxes and payroll taxes do not take into account ability to pay and the consequence is that
a person with a lower income often pays a greater proportion oftheir income in tax than
a person with a higher income.
The (non) taxation ofwealth also contributes to the lack ofprogressivity in the tax
system. Canada is one of only three OECD countries that does not levy either an annual
wealth tax or impose estate taxes, succession duties or gift taxes.36 As Lisa Philipps
points out, the exclusion of wealth from the tax base is not a gender neutral policy.
Wealth distribution in Canada is highly gendered with women at a serious disadvantage
to men in terms of property ownership.3 7 This means that "the ability to inherit and hold
wealth free oftax primarily benefits men, and helps to preserve the economic inequalities
which are the hallmark of women's subordination."38 One of the objectives of a tax
system is the redistribution ofincome and resources from the rich to the poor.39 Ifwealth,
as constituted by property primarily owned by men, is not part of the personal tax base,
any redistribution of wealth is adversely affected by that omission. Because women
form the majority ofthepoorin Canada, theybeartheburden ofthe adverse consequences.
My primary focus in this article is, however, the tax system as a spending program.
One example of a tax expenditure that operates in an inequitable manner as a result of
the gendered nature of wealth ownership in Canada is the preferential tax treatment of
capital gains. Capital gains receive preferential tax treatment in several ways. First, only
some capital gains are taxed. Any gain on the disposition of property that qualifies as a
principal residence is not taxed for the period that the property so qualifies.41 Secondly,
if a gain on disposition of capital property is taxable 4' only three-quarters of the gain is
included in income.42 Thirdly, the capital gains exemption permits a deduction in the
35 An income tax credit with respect to the GST was implemented when the tax was introduced
in an attempt to reduce some of the regressive effects of the flat rate tax (Act, supra note 5, s. 122.5).
Nevertheless, the credit does not mitigate entirely the regressive effect of the GST. See N. Brooks,
SearchingforanAlternative to the GST(Discussion Paper 90.C. 1) (Ottawa: The Institute forResearch
on Public Policy, 1990).
36 The other countries are Australia and New Zealand. For a history of wealth taxes in Canada,
see M. Cullity and C. Brown, Taxation and Estate Planning, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 10-
12. The federal government ceased to levy an estate tax after 1971 and the last province to vacate the
field of succession duties and estate taxes was Quebec in 1986.
37 L. Philipps, "Tax Policy and the Gendered Distribution of Wealth" in I. Bakker, ed.,
Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
forthcoming).
38 Ibid. at 16.
39 For an excellent analysis of the tax system's increasing ineffectiveness as an income
distribution tool see N. Brooks, "The Changing Structure ofthe Canadian Tax System: Accommodating
the Rich" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 138. In this article Professor Brooks traces the influence of
neoconservatism in current tax policy and discusses how neoconservatives have reinterpreted the
traditional objectives of a tax system and the criteria used in evaluating that system.
40 Ss. 40 and 54(g) of the Act. For 1991, the value of this exclusion was $3,190 million if one
assumes that if taxed the gain would have been taxed at three-quarters of the taxpayers tax rate. See
Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures, supra note 12 at 18.
4 It shouldalsobenotedthatss. 70 and73 oftheActprovide forthe"rollover" of capital property
to a spouse, either during the transferor's lifetime or on death. The result is that any gain that would
normally be taxed as a consequence of the disposition of the capital property is deferred until the
transferee disposes of the property. I do not propose to discuss these provisions.
42 S. 38 of the Act states that a taxable capital gain is three-quarters of the capital gain and an
allowable capital loss is three-quarters of the capital loss. For the 1988 and 1989 taxation years, the
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computation of taxable income of up to $375,000 in respect of a taxable capital gain on
the disposition of qualified small business shares and qualified farm property.
43
It is axiomatic that poor women tend not to own capital property that would be
taxable on its disposition, andtherefore do notbenefitfrom this allocation ofgovernment
resources by way of tax expenditures. But neither do women generally. 44 The result is
that men benefit more than women from the tax subsidies related to the ownership of
capital property. In 1992 the value of the capital gains deductions45 claimed by men was
an average of $5,564 more per person than that claimed by women. In terms of the total
amount of capital gains deductions claimed this translated to nearly $4.5 billion claimed
by men while women claimed only a total ofjust over $2 billion. To put it another way,
in 1992 women claimed capital gains deductions of a total of only 46 per cent of what
men claimed.4 1 Unfortunately the statistics do not give a breakdown of the type of
property in respect of which the deduction was claimed. This makes it difficult to predict
the effect of limiting the deduction to qualified small business shares and qualified farm
property. But we know, for example, that in 1992 more than 325,000 men included
farming income in their returns while less than 100,000 women did so47 and 62 per cent
of those including net business income in their tax returns were men while only 38 per
cent were women .4 These figures indicate that, despite the recent changes to the capital
gains deduction, there is a strong likelihood that men will continue to benefit from it to
a greater extent than women. The statistics on the realization of taxable capital gains
presents a similargenderbreakdown. In 1992 men benefited more from the low effective
rate of taxation on capital gains. Specifically, more men than women realised taxable
capital gains, 49 and, perhaps most importantly, the value of the taxable capital gains
realised by women was only $2.8 billionwhile men realised more than twice that amount
at $6.2 billion. What these figures tell us is that men are benefiting disproportionately
from the tax subsidy generated by the exclusion from income of one-quarter of each
portion was two-thirds and from 1972 to 1987 it was one-half. In 1991, the value of this expenditure
was $665 million. See Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures, supra note 12 at 16.
43 S. 110.6 of the Act provides a lifetime exemption of $375,000 for an individual with respect
to any gain on the disposition of qualified small business shares and qualified farm property. Prior to
1992, the exemption applied to a broader range of property. According to Personal and Corporate
Income Tax Expenditures, ibid. at 16 and 18, the value ofthe tax expenditure for 1991 was $585 million
for qualified small business shares and $235 for qualified farm property.
44 For example, more men than women own their own homes and therefore benefit from the
principal residence exemption. In 1986, 42 per cent of women owned the dwelling in which they
resided compared with 70 per cent of men. See Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical
Report, 2d ed. (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1990) at 27 [hereinafter Women in Canada].
Furthermore, single mothers are less likelyto own theirown homes than husband and wife households.
In 1986, 72 per cent of female lone parent households rented their home compared with 27 per cent
of husband and wife households. See C. McKie and K. Thompson, eds., Canadian Social Trends
(Toronto: Supply & Services Canada and Thompson Educational Publishing, 1990) at 126.
4- This included the $100,000 lifetime personal exemption which has since been repealed.
46 The exact figures, as calculated from Table 4 at 106-107 line 37 in Revenue Canada, Taxation
Statistics: Analyzing the Returns for the 1992 Taxation Year and Miscellaneous Statistics (Ottawa:
Supply & Services Canada, 1994) [hereinafter Taxation Statistics], are $4,421,719,000 in capital gains
deductions claimed by men and $2,052,703,000 claimed by women.
47 Ibid. line 25.
48 Ibid. line 22.
49 In 1992,449,660 men realised taxable capital gains compared with only 324,690 women. Ibid.
line 20.
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capital gain. There is a great deal of rhetoric around the reasons for the preferential tax
treatment of capital gains. Certainly one reason for the preferential tax treatment of
capital gains is, as the former Finance Minister Michael Wilson put it, to "unlease the
full entrepreneurial dynamism of individual Canadians" but perhaps he really meant
"male Canadians" and not all individual Canadians, regardless of gender.5 0
The fact that the tax system clearly favours investment in equity over investment in
debt is further evidence ofits inequitable application to women. As I have illustrated, any
gain on an equity investment such as a share is not taxed at the full rate. Another
advantage for the investor in equity is the dividend tax credit which reduces the amount
of taxes payable on dividend income." This situation can be contrasted to the tax
treatment of the interest income generated by debt instruments such as bonds. The
statistics show the gender inequality. Women clearly prefer to put their money in
investments such as bonds and bank savings accounts which generate interest income. 2
There may be several reasons for this preference, including the fact that because women
tend to be poorer than men, they have less to invest and certainly less to risk in ventures
such as investment in the stock market. But these figures surely call for a rethinking of
how tax subsidies are allocated.
As previously mentioned, the effect ofpoverty and income inequality is important
in my analysis ofthe tax system. But as I proceed to considerthe impact ofthe tax system
on elderly women, lesbians and mothers my discussion of its impact on poor women is
relevant because, of course, many of these women also live in poverty. And, as I shall
discuss, the tax system is guilty offurther contributing to and entrenching theirpoverty.
B. Elderly Women
In its final report, before being disbanded as one ofthe "cost-saving" measures that
were part of the 1995 budget, the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women
painted a bleak picture of the financial future for women currently in the 45-54 age
range.5 3 The conclusion was that the benefits provided by the two main government
pension programs, Old Age Security and the Canada Pension Plan, are inadequate and
increasingly women will have to rely on private sources of retirement income such as
employment pension plans, registered retirement savings plans and their personal
savings. Retirement income in Canada takes many forms. The Canadian pension system
so Canada, House of Commons, Securing Economic Renewal: The Budget Speech (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 23 May 1985) at 6.
5' S. 121 of theAct provides atax credit of 16 2/3 percent in respect of dividend income. When
provincial taxes are taken into account, the amount ofthe credit is approximately 25 percent. It should
be noted that one reason for the low rate of tax on dividends is to take into account the tax assumed
to be paid by the corporation on its earnings. Nevertheless, the consequence is that the shareholder
receives a subsidy. Indeed if a shareholder has no other income for the 1994 taxation year, she may
receive dividend income of up to $23,750 on a tax free basis.
12 In 1992, women received interest income from bonds of $1,865,367,000 and from bank
deposits of $9,974,015,000. The figures for men were $1,404,029,000 for bond income and
$8,399,152,000 for interest from bank deposits. See Taxation Statistics, supra note 46 lines 13 and 14
respectively.
53 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Women's Financial Futures: Mid-Life
Prospectsfor a Secure Retirement (Background Paper) by M. Townson (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, 1995).
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can be described as a pyramid,54 at its base Old Age Security (OAS), supplemented by
the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), a flat rate monthly amount paid to those over
65. The next level is the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) which is intended to provide
retirement income for those who have participated in the paid labour force. Because of
the inadequacies of these government programs,5 recourse to private pension plans is
frequently necessary and indeed being encouraged by the government.5 6 At the apex of
the pyramid are the two private pension programs, the Registered Pension Plan (RPP),
an employment based pension plan, and the Registered Retirement Savings Plan
(RRSP), a personal retirement plan. As I shall discuss, both these plans are heavily
subsidised by the tax system.
In its report, Women and Taxation, the Women and Taxation Working Group of the
Ontario Fair Tax Commission said that "[t]he current system of tax-assisted savings for
retirement results in systemic discrimination against women, as the benefits are
disproportionately enjoyed by men."57 The result for many women is poverty in
retirement. Elderly single women are disproportionately represented among the poor in
Canada. In 1992, 45.2 per cent of unattached women over 65 lived below the poverty
line and the depth of their poverty was on average $2,480 below that line.5 8 Retirement
saving is subsidised extensivelybythetax systemthroughtaxbreaksforboth contributions
to, and income earned by, RPPs and RRSPs. For example, subsections 147.2(1) and (4)
of the Act permit the deduction by employers and employees of their contributions to a
registered pension plan. Section 149(l)(o.1) provides that the income earned by funds
in the registered pension plan is not taxable. For 1991, the value of this preferential tax
treatment was in excess of $13 billion, making it the single largest tax expenditure that
year. 9 Contributions to RRSPs (limited to 18 per cent of earned income up to a
4 This metaphor is used in an excellent article which discusses the discriminatory effect of the
Canadian pension system for women and analyses many of its privatising effects. See M. Donnelly,
"The Disparate Effect of Pension Reform on Women" (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 419.
I- The inadequacies ofthe OAS, GIS and CPP have been well documented. See Townson, supra
note 53 at33 and 61; Women in Canada, supra note 44 at 109-110; Women andPovertyRevisited, supra
note 32 at 99-103; N.Z. Ghalam, Women in the Workplace, 2d ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1993)
at 45; T.J. Courchene, Social Canada in the Millenium: Reform Imperatives and Restructuring
Principles, c. 3 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994) at 66-78; S. Harder, Women in Canada: Socio-
Economic Status and Other Contemporary Issues, Current Issue Review (Revised 30 Nov 1994)
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Research Branch, 1994) at 8. The maximum amount available under
the OAS and GIS is below the low-income cut off for both single individuals and couples. CPP
retirement benefits are equivalent to only 25 per cent of covered lifetime earnings. In 1993, women
received only 58.8 per cent of what men received as benefits under CPP/QPP. See Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, Work in Progress: Tracking Women s Equality in Canada (Ottawa:
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1994) at 44 [hereinafter Work in Progress].
56 Certainly successive governments have demonstratedacommitmentto encouraging retirement
saving through private plans rather than increasing benefits under OAS or CPP. This policy choice has
been made by successive federal governments, both Conservative and Liberal. In endorsing this policy,
Marc Lalonde (formerly the Canadian Finance Minister) put it this way: "Private arrangements provide
the individual with greater flexibility and personal control over pension saving than are possible under
public pension programs, with their fixed schedules ofcontributions and benefits." Canada, Department
of Finance, Building Better Pensionsfor Canadians: Improved Tax Assistancefor Retirement Saving
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1984) at 6-7.
57 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Taxation (Working Group Report) (Toronto:
Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1992) at 22.
58 Poverty Profile 1992, supra note 31.
59 Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures, supra note 12 at 18.
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maximum contribution of $13,500 for the 1994 taxation year) are also deductible and
the income earned by the funds accumulates within the plan on a tax free basis. A
taxpayer is also permitted to claim a deduction (subject to limitations as to amount) for
contributions to a RRSP of which the taxpayer's spouse is an annuitant.
The "privatisation" of retirement savings is problematic in many respects. By
encouraging retirement savings through contributions to registered pension plans rather
than through a more universal scheme, the State is delivering a publicly funded subsidy
in a manner that excludes many from entitlement. Only those who work for relatively
large employers who are economically able to provide a pension plan will benefit; those
who work part time, in non-unionised jobs, or for small employers unable to finance
these plans, or those who are self employed or unemployed, do not benefit. Women are
disproportionately represented in the group unable to take advantage of these tax
benefits. For example, between 1976 and 1991 women consistently represented at least
70 per cent of part time workers 6 and, while women have been entering the workforce
in increasing numbers, 42 per cent ofwomen do notparticipate in the paid labour force.
61
Of those women who are employed in the paid labour force, only 42.5 per cent are
covered by RPPs.62
Women who do not have access to work related pension plans may contribute to
RRSPs but the ability to take advantage of the preferential tax treatment afforded to
contributions to these plans is dependent on having funds with which to make the
contribution. Given that women earn considerably less than men, they tend to have less
discretionary income to contribute to a RRSP. This is evident when one looks at the
statistics on who contributes to a RRSP and how much they contribute. In 1992, more
men than women contributed to a RRSP, and, although the disparity in the relative
numbers of men to women who contributed was not particularly great,63 there was a
significant difference in the amounts contributed. In total, men contributed almost $10
billion to RRSPs while women contributed just over half that amount, at slightly over
$5 billion. Clearly the tax subsidy is not being shared in anything like an equal fashion
by men and women.
Neither RPPs nor RRSPs are likely to be of any benefit to women who work inside
the home and do notparticipate in the paid labour force. These women do not have access
to employment related plans and, with no income, are unlikely to be able to contribute
to a RRSP. The tax system recognises this problem and attempts to redress it partially
by including special rules that apply to spouses. For example, RPPs may provide
survivor benefits (either pre- or post-retirement) which ensure that pension payments
made to an individual can, on the death of the individual, be received by the individual's
spouse."s Similarly, an individual may, subject to limitations as to amount, contribute to
6 Women in the Workplace, supra note 55 at 21.
61 Canada, Statistics Canada, Household Surveys Division, Labour Force Annual Averages
1991 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology, 1992).
61 Townson, supra note 53 at 37. The figure for men is somewhat higher at 51.8 per cent.
63 In 1992, 2,784,180 men and 2,052,230 women contributed to RRSPs. Taxation Statistics,
supra note 46 line 3 1.
' S. 252(4) of the Act provides that a spouse of a taxpayer includes the person of the opposite
sex who cohabits with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and has so cohabited with the taxpayer
for 12 months, or is the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is also a parent. It does not include the
partners of lesbians and gay men. The issue of the discriminatory effects of this definition for lesbians
is discussed later in this article.
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a RRSP in their spouse's name. However, this rule and the provision ofsurvivorbenefits
are highly problematic. State subsidised benefits are being provided to individuals
solely on the basis that they are in a particular defined relationship with another person.
Single persons and those whose relationships are not recognised by the tax system, such
as lesbians, are discriminated against. There is a second aspect to this problem.
Historically the tax system has viewed some forms of dependency as deserving ofrelief,
and the result is a privatisation of economic responsibility for dependent persons. The
subsidy is delivered to the economically dominant person in the relationship not the
"dependent" person who needs it. This manner of delivery assumes that income will be
pooled and wealth redistributed equitably in the relationship. However, studies have
shown that this assumption is simply false and that, in reality, such pooling and
redistribution of wealth does not occur in the majority of relationships."
Making the only access to tax subsidised pensions such as RPPs and RRSPs for
many women dependent on their relationship with a man is unacceptable. As Maureen
Donnelly states, "A pension system which assumes a 'world composed of only two
categories ofpeople: full-time participants in the labour market (husbands and fathers),
andthe people they support (women and children)' does not fit the experience ofwomen
today; yet the Canadian tax system is still relying on yesterday's reality".6 The reality
is that more women than ever before are living either alone or with their children, and
the vast majority of lone parent families are headed by women with recent estimates
ranging from 82 per cent 7 to almost 92 per cent.6 It is high time that the government
acknowledged this situation and adjusted their tax policy accordingly.
As with so many tax expenditures, the tax relief provided by contributions to RPPs
and RRSPs is in the form of a deduction and not a tax credit. Therefore, as discussed
above, those who benefit from the deduction are those with income taxed at the top rate
oftax and sincementendto eammore andbe wealthierthanwomen, they correspondingly
receive greater subsidies. Indeed, the tax provisions relating to private pension plans
establish a hierarchy of taxpayers with respect to retirement saving which is in inverse
relation to their ability to provide financially for their retirement. At the top are those
with the highest incomes (predominantly men) and below them in declining order are
taxpayers with lower incomes. At the bottom are those to whom the deduction is
worthless, either because they do not have access to a RPP, they do not have funds to
contribute to a RRSP, they do not have access through a spouse to a pension plan or
simply because they have insufficient taxable income to benefit from the deduction.
Converting the deduction to a tax credit would ensure that it is of equal value in terms
oftax dollars savedto all taxpayers.69 Convertingthe deductionto a refundable tax credit
65 Women and Taxation, supra note 57 at 7 discussed this issue and concluded that the
assumption that income is pooled is misleading. See also Philipps and Young, supra note 27 at 79.
66 See Donnelly, supra note 54 at 423.
67 This is a 1991 statistic from C. McKie and K. Thompson, eds., Canadian Social Trends, vol.
2 (Toronto: Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology& Thompson Educational Publishing, 1994)
at 172.
618 This is a 1988 statistic from Statistics Canada & Health and Welfare Canada found in
Canadian National Child Care Study: Introductory Report by D.S. Lero et al. (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada; Health and Welfare Canada, 1992) at 44.
19 See Townson, supra note 53 at 64 where, among other recommendations, she proposes that
"[t]he deduction for contributions to pension plans and RRSPs should be converted to a credit."
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would mean that even a person who does not pay tax could benefit from the tax
advantage if they had funds to contribute to the RPP or the RRSP.
None ofthese suggestions address theproblems ofthose excluded from the system.
More radical measures, such as greater access to private employment pension plans for
part time workers and improvements to the CPP to include those currently excluded,
would go some way to redressing the inequities I have discussed. Alternatively, the tax
incentives could be abolished in their entirety and the surplus funds used to enrich the
CPP and OAS systems. But, as long as the government remains committedto encouraging
retirement savings through private pension plans, then the question of whether the tax
system is the appropriate method of doing this must be addressed.70 The answer is surely
not, given the inequities that I have discussed.
C. Lesbians
The Actprovides that a spouse of a taxpayer includes the person ofthe opposite sex
who cohabits with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and:
a) has so cohabited with the taxpayer for 12 months, or
b) is the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is also a parent. (emphasis added)7'
Notably, the definition does not include same-sex relationships. 721 I have discussed this
omission elsewhere in detail 3 and concluded that the consequences for tax purposes of
this omission depend to a great extent on the level of income of both partners in the
relationship and the distribution of income between them. It is those couples in which
one partner is economically dependent on the other that lose the most from not being
considered to be spouses under the Act.74
I have already discussed the limitations ofthe tax reliefprovidedforprivate pension
plans and noted that there are special rules that apply to spouses which are intended to
alleviate some of the problems for women unable to contribute to these plans. For
example, RPPs may provide survivor benefits on the death of a plan member (eitherpre-
orpost-retirement) to the surviving spouse ofthe plan member. Butthe regulations made
underthe Act state that if a RPP provides survivor benefits to anyone other than a spouse
(as defined in the Act) the Minister of National Revenue may refuse to register the
pension plan or may deregister an already registered plan.75 Therefore, if the plan
provides benefits to its lesbian employees on the same basis as its heterosexual
employees, the plan is not eligible for the preferential tax treatment. This makes it
financially impossible foremployersto includelesbian employeesinthe same employment
70 For an extensive list of recommendations for improvement to the current retirement system
as it affects women see, Townson, ibid. at 61-66.
71 S. 252(4) of the Act. Because s. 252(1)(d) defines "child" to include an adopted child, parent
includes a person who is an adoptive parent.
n The focus of this section of the article is the application of the tax system to lesbians. Except
where otherwise noted my comments also apply to gay men.
73 C.F.L. Young, "Taxing Times for Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?" (1994)
Dalhousie L.J. 534. As I point out in that article, there are some benefits for lesbians (and gay men)
as a result of not being considered spouses but my conclusion is that overall, the lost tax subsidies are
considerable and, for most lesbians, will outweigh the limited advantages. See also, P. Lefebour,
"Same Sex Spousal Recognition in Ontario" (1993) J.L. & Social Pol'y 272.
74 Young, ibid. at 535.
75 Reg. 8502(c), 8503(2) and 8506 made pursuant to the Act.
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pension plan as heterosexual employees76 and it appears that very few employers have
set up separate pension plans for their lesbian employees. 7 It is important to note that
contributing to an employment pension plan is not usually optional. It is a condition of
employment. This creates a situation where lesbian employees are required to contribute
to a plan under which they do not receive the same benefits as their heterosexual co-
workers, a plan that is also subsidised by their tax dollars. 78
Other situations of inequality for lesbians also stem from the limited definition of
spouse in the Act. For example, the ability to contribute to a spousal RRSP is similarly
limited to heterosexual couples. The spousal tax credit79 is not available to those in
lesbian relationships, nor is the ability to transferunused tax credits to a partnerwho may
use them to offset her taxes payable. The unused portion of the tuition tax credit, 0 the
education tax credit,8' the age credit, the pension credit and the disability credit 2 may
all be transferred to a spouse under the Act. Further, spouses are entitled to pool their
medical expenses for the purposes ofthe medical expense tax credit.83 All ofthese rules
are of benefit where one person in the relationship has taxable income and the other has
little or no taxable income to which to apply the credits. None are available to lesbians.
D. Mothers
Much ofthe early feminist work on the impact ofthe tax system on mothers focused
on issues such as the lack of tax relief for some of the costs of parenting such as child
care expenses or expenses related to child dependency. The challenges to the Act by
Elizabeth Symes and Suzanne Thibaudeau have resulted in a renewed and greater
awareness of the inadequacy of the current deduction for child care expenses and the
adverse affect on women of the requirement to include child support payments in
income.
76 In Leschnerv. Ontario (No. 2) (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/184 an Ontario Board of Inquiry held
that a gay man was discriminated against on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation under
the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, because his employer, the Government of
Ontario, refused to amend his benefit plan from single to family coverage in order to cover his male
partner. In their decision the Board prescribed a remedy that included an order that, if the changes to
the definition of spouse to include lesbians and gay men for the purposes of registered pension plans
were not made to the Act within three years of the order, the Government of Ontario must "create a
funded or unfunded arrangement outside of the registered pension plan to provide for equivalent
survivorbenefits and eligibility to persons living in homosexual conjugal relationships with employees
as provided to persons living in heterosexual conjugal relationships with employees outside marriage"
(at D/224).
77 See e.g., "Same-Sex Ruling Puts Firms in Catch 22" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15
February 1993) B4. One employer which has established a separate pension plan for its lesbian and
gay employees is the Bank of Montreal. See "Bank of Montreal Extends Same-Sex Spousal Benefits"
XTRA WEST (29 June 1995) 11.
78 The discriminatory impact of the definition of "spouse" as it applies to RPPs was challenged
as contravening s. 15 of the Charter in CUPE et aL v. Minister of National Revenue, a case heard by
the Ontario Court, General Division on July 25, 1995. The decision has not yet been released by the
court.
79 S. I18(l)(a) of the Act.
80 S. 118.5 oftheAct.
8, S. 118.6 oftheAct.
82 S. 118.8 oftheAct permits the transferto a spouse ofthe unused portion ofthese three credits.
83 The definition of "patient" is defined to include a spouse, in s. I 1 8.2(2)(a) of the Act.
[Vol. 27:1I
Women, Tax and Poverty
The lack of affordable, accessible child care in Canada is a significant impediment
to entry or re-entry in the paid labour force for women with children.84 For some women
it means not working outside the home, and for others it means part time work, shift
work, or work at a location close to home. Indeed 1991 statistics indicate that women
form 70 per cent of the part time labour force" and, one-quarter of women aged 25 to
44 working part time cited personal or family responsibilities as the reason for working
part time.8 6 The lack of available child care is clearly linked to women's economic
inequality relativeto men. As mentioned, women earn less thanmen and one contributing
factor is that the part time work so many women perform is less remunerative than full
time work. Women may also work injobs that require fewer overtime hours orthat allow
them unpaid leave during school vacation. The child care expense deduction87 is
intended to alleviate some of the expenses incurred by women for child care but it is
highly flawed in several respects. 88 First, as discussed above,89 since it is a deduction in
the computation of taxable income, the most benefit in terms of tax dollars saved goes
to those women with the highest incomes and the least benefit to those with lower
incomes. Because the subsidy is not delivered as a refundable tax credit, it is ofno benefit
to women with no tax liability. Secondly, only certain women are eligible for the
deduction. Because the definition of the "earned income" from which child care
expenses may be deducted is so limited, women whose sole income is unemployment
insurance, spousal support or child support payments may not deduct child care
expenses. This means, for example, that women who are looking for employment or
women who are furthering their education in order to return to work, will not receive the
subsidy. Thirdly, the amount ofthe deduction is inadequate. Some 1988 figures put the
estimated annual cost of regulated child care at $7,188 a year for infants and $5,361 for
14 For example, a report by the National Council of Welfare, Incentives and Disincentives to
Work (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1993) at 41 makes the point that the shortage of adequate
and affordable child care creates a serious disincentive for women to seek work. Women who would
normally receive lowwages in the labourforce and who face the high costs ofsuitable child care, which
normally cost several thousand dollars a year or more per child, may find it more economical to stay
at home. This reality is recognized by the government in its Discussion Paper, Improving Social
Security in Canada (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1994) where it states that "In many cases, the
lack of affordable, high quality child care is an insurmountable barrier to a job." (at 53).
85 Work in Progress, supra note 55 at 49.
86 D.S. Lero and K.L. Johnson, 110 Canadian Statistics on Work & Family (Background Paper)
(Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1994) at 5. Further, along similar lines,
during 1988-1990 7.6 per cent or 298,000 women aged 16-64 left their jobs because of "family
responsibilities", the most common of which would presumably be caring for children. This is
compared with a mere 1.2 per cent or48,000 men who cited family responsibilities as their reason for
leaving their jobs. (Incentives and Disincentives to Work, supra note 84 at 17-19).
7 S. 63 of the Act provides a deduction of $5000 for a child under 7 (or who has a prolonged
mental or physical impairment), and $3000 for a child aged 7 to 13. The expense must be incurred to
enable the taxpayer or supporting person who resides with the child to perform the duties of
employment, carry on a business, undertake occupational training under the National TrainingAct or
carry on grant funded research. The deductible amount is limitedto the lesser ofthe amounts described
above ortwo-thirds ofthe taxpayer's earned income forthe year. In two parent families, the deduction
must be claimed by the person earning the lower income, with limited exceptions.
88 Foradetailed analysis oftheproblems withthe deduction see "Child Care-A Taxing Issue",
supra note 27.
89 On pp. 105-06, above.
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preschoolers.90 The National Action Committee on the Status ofWomen recently stated
that in B.C., care in a good program can cost as much as $1,000 per month.9" However,
the maximum that may be claimed for a child under the age of 7 is $5000 a year which
translates to only $2500 in terms oftax dollars saved for a woman who pays tax at a high
rate. It has been estimated that families spent over $2 billion on child care in 1987,92 and
yet the amount of tax dollars spent on the deduction for child care expenses a year later
was only $245 million.93
The inadequacy of the amount of this subsidy underlies the recent challenge to the
non-deductibility of child care expenses as a business expense by Elizabeth Symes. She
is a practising lawyer and at the relevant time was a partner in a law firm who argued that
she should be able to deduct the full amount of her child care expenses as a business
expense under sections 9 and 18(1)(a) of the Act, and that to deny the deduction was to
discriminate against her on the basis of her sex in contravention of section 15 of the
Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada denied her claim and the majority found that
child care expenses are not deductible in the computation of business income but
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in dissent, raised an important issue. She discussed in detail the
gender-biased nature of the relevant tax provisions, describing the interpretation of
"business expense" as one "wrought with male perspective and subjectivity"' 4 and said
"....it is clear that this area of the law is premised on the traditional view of business as
a male enterprise and that the concept of a business expense has itself been constructed
on the basis of the needs of businessmen"95 (emphasis in the original). The same might
be said of many provisions of the Act.
At the time the Supreme Court of Canada was considering the Symes case, another
Charter challenge to a provision of the Act was underway. This time the focus was the
requirement that child support payments be included in the income of the recipient.96 In
particular, section 60(b) and (c) of the Act provides a deduction in the computation of
income to those who pay child support and section 56(1)(b) and (c) require that child
support payments be included in the income of the recipient if they are deductible by the
payor. The gender dimensions ofthese rules are very simple: 98 per cent ofthose paying
child support and thereby entitled to the tax deduction are men and 98 per cent of those
90 This is an Ontario Ministry ofCommunity and Social Services estimate from Statistics Canada
& Health and Welfare Canada, Canadian National Child Care Study: Canadian Child Care in Context,
A.R. Pence, ed., (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992) at 396.
9' National Action Committee on the Status of Women, Review of the Situation of Women in
Canada 1993 by P. Khosla (Toronto: National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 1993) at
19.
92 Lero and Johnson, supra note 86 at 36.
93 Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures, supra note 12 at 14. (Figures not available
for 1987.) It should be noted that the child care expenses deduction is listed in this document as a
"memorandum" item which means that the government does not technically list it as atax expenditure.
The reason given (at 29) is that child care expenses are considered to be an expense of earning taxable
income. Nevertheless, I would argue that even if child care expenses are not technically considered to
be tax expenditures, thepublication ofthe amount spent onthem allows us to evaluatethem in a manner
similar to that applied to tax expenditures. I would also suggest that because the policy underlying the
introduction of the child care expense in 1970 was to enable women to participate in the paid labour
force, the expense is part of a social spending program.
94 Symes, supra note 9 at 95.
95 Ibid. at 90.
96 The Tax Court heard Thibaudeau (T.C.C.), supra note 10, on August 25, 1992.
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receiving child support payments which they must include in their income are women. 97
In May 1994, the Federal Court of Appeal held in Thibaudeau (F.C.A.) that the
requirement to include child support payments in income contravened section 15 ofthe
Charter because it discriminated against separated custodial parents." This decision
was heralded by many women's groups as a victory for women who receive child
support from their ex-spouses.99 The response of the federal government was twofold;
it appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada' and it established the Task
Force on Child Care headed by Sheila Finestone, Secretary of State (Status of Women)
to "seek the views of Canadians ..... on the tax treatment of child support".' 0' The report
of the Task Force has, as of date of writing, not been released to the public.
In order to fully appreciate the inequalities experienced by custodial mothers that
flow from the inclusion/deduction system it is important to examine the primary
justification for the current rules, as put forward by the Department of Justice in
Thibaudeau. The argument is that the inclusion/deduction system provides a subsidy
which benefits custodial families by making more resources available forthe support of
children.0 2 The subsidy arises where the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the
recipient because the monetary value of the deduction to the payor exceeds the amount
oftax payable by the recipient. In theory, this permits a higher support award. It has been
estimated that the amount of the tax subsidy is approximately $300 million a year.0 3
Certainly the objective of providing such a subsidy is laudable and reflects a desire by
97 See the evidence ofNathalie Martel, a federal government economist, on cross examination
in Thibaudeau, Supplementary Case on Appeal, Vol. 2 at 185.
91 The comparison was with non-separated custodial parents who might receive child support
from a spouse, separated non-custodial parents who might receive amounts from a third party for the
support of a child and separated custodial non-parents who might receive amounts for the support of
a child in their care. In each of these cases there is no requirement to include the amount in income.
99 See e.g. "Mothers Stand to Gain Through Tax Ruling" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (4 May
1994) A2, where Ardyth Cooper, of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women said that,
"[i]t sends out a clear message that the rights ofthese parents -most ofthem women and many ofthem
among Canada's poorest - cannot be trampled on by outdated tax law".
"I The federal government asked the Supreme Court of Canada to stay the order of the Federal
Court of Appeal while the case was under appeal and the Supreme Court acceded to this request. On
May 25, 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the appeal and by a majority of 5 to 2 held that
the requirement to include child support payments in income did not contravene the Charter. See the
discussion of the decision, beginning on p. 116, above.
101 Introduction to Canada, Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Task Group on
the Tax Treatment of Child Support: Discussion Points (Ottawa: CACSW, 1994).
"0I The other policy rationales are:
a) the deduction provides equity for non-custodial fathers because it recognises that he has
a reduced ability to pay tax as comparedto someone with the same income who does not have
to pay child support;
b) the requirement to include child support payments in income recognises the basic
principle of fairness that taxpayers with income from different sources should pay the same
tax; and
c) the principle of reciprocity should be recognised and that a payment deducted by the
father must be included in the income of the mother.
For a discussion of the policy rationales, see e.g. Zweibel and Shillington, supra note 27; "Broadening
the Agenda", supra note 27; "Constitutional Challenge", supra note 27; Philipps and Young, supra
note 27.
'13 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Family Law Committee's Report and Recommendations on
Child Support (Canada: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1995) at 49.
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the State to recognise the extra expenses incurred with respectto the support of children
of families that have broken down. The problem is, however, twofold. First, the subsidy
only arises in the limited number of cases where the payor is in a higher tax bracket than
the recipient. If both pay tax at the same rate or the recipient pays at the higher rate there
is no subsidy and, indeed there may be a tax penalty. Secondly, as I shall explain, even
when there is a subsidy, the result is not necessarily higher support awards for women
but frequently just more after tax dollars for men.
Several studies have focused on the issue of how frequently a subsidy arises by
reason of the payor being in a higher tax bracket than the recipient and estimates of the
number of cases in which this occurs have ranged from 34 per cent'1 4 to 67 per cent.0 5
Regardless of the exact figures, the Federal Court of Appeal in Thibaudeau (F.C.A.)
recognised that
[e]ven on the government's own figures the inclusion/deduction system, whose alleged
purpose is to benefit single custodial parents and their children, cannot do so in at least
one third of the cases. There is no guarantee that it actually does so in the remaining two
thirds of the cases and there is evidence to suggest that it does not.1
0 6
What is so interesting about this rationale for the inclusion/deduction rules is that
whether or not a "couple" receives a subsidy is totally dependent on an arbitrary factor,
that is the rate at which the former spouses pay tax. Determining entitlement to the
subsidy is beyond their control and, indeed entitlement may be lost or gained as the tax
rates of the individuals in the "couple" change.
Regardless of whether or not the respective tax rates of the payor and recipient
produce a subsidy, women face a significant problem as a result ofthe requirement that
they include child support in income. In order that the recipient not be at a disadvantage
because of the tax liability, she must request an adjustment (the "gross-up") to the
amount of the child support award to take her tax liability into account. As L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. points out in Thibaudeau, "the system increases the vulnerability ofthe custodial
parent, who must now bargain for the income tax gross-up in order to protect the
effective value of the child support payment."'0 7 If she is not successful in doing so she
suffers the financial penalty ofthe lost tax dollars. McLachlinJ. in Thibaudeau described
the inequity this way:
Whether the custodial parent receives such an adjustment or not, the non-custodial
parent may reduce his tax burden by deducting the full amount of the child support paid
by him in computing his taxable income. On the other hand, not only must the custodial
parent request any adjustment from the court, it is not always certain that the court will
10 Zweibel and Shillington, supra note 27 at 13. This study found that in only 34 percent of the
cases was a net tax gain realised due to non-custodial fathers being in a higher tax bracket than the
custodial mothers who received the support. Zweibel and Shillington state that in the cases where there
is no potential subsidy because the mother's tax liability is greaterthan the father's tax savings and the
Finance Department's primary rationale supporting the current tax regime thus fails, the Finance
Department's response has been to ignore them (at 17).
105 Evidence of Nathalie Martel discussed in Thibaudeau (F.C.A) supra note 10 at 18-19.
1o Ibid. at 19.
107 Supra note 10 atpara. 39, quoting EllenZweibel in "Constitutional Challenge", supra note 27
at 342.
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correctly assess the tax impact or will award a sufficient amount to enable the recipient
to discharge her additional tax burden.108
Family law is thus relied upon to compensate for the imposition of a tax liability.) 9
But such compensation is not always forthcoming. Studies have shown that, in fact,
either the amount is not grossed-up to take tax consequences into account, or if an
attempt is made to gross-up the award, it is frequently not done accurately." 0 For
example, in order to include the full tax liability of the recipient of child support, the
amount ofthe award mustbe grossed-up more than once so thatthe gross-up is itselfthen
grossed-up to take account of the tax liability. Without this second adjustment, the tax
payable on the gross-up is not taken into account, resulting in a failure to fully
compensate the recipient forhertax liability. Also, because entitlementto refundable tax
credits such as the Goods and Services Tax credit and the Child Tax Benefit decreases
as income increases, the inclusion in income of an award may have the adverse result
ofreducing the amount of those credits for the recipient ofthe child support. Ifthe award
is grossed-up to reflect the tax liability, the gross-up itself may trigger a reduction in the
amount ofthe refundable credits.'' It should also be notedthat none ofthese adjustments
to the amount ofthe child support payments meanthat the subsidy, if any, is in fact shared
by the parties. As McLachlin J. said in Thibaudeau:
The problem is that the overall context in which this scheme is applied does not require,
and in some cases prevents, an equitable division of this tax benefit between the
separated or divorced parents. In many cases in which a tax benefit results from the
application of the deduction/inclusion scheme, the benefit is not passed on to the
custodial parent or the children and remains in the possession of the non-custodial
parent."12
The issue of grossing-up or dividing the subsidy is not just a mechanical matter. In
many cases, judges base the amount of the award on their perception of how much the
payor can afford and studies of child support awards show thatthe average child support
orderis for considerably less than one-halfofthe expenses actually incurred with respect
"I Ibid. atpara. 180.
1'9 McLachlin J. in Thibaudeau, ibid. atpara. 174, described the problems with the tax legislation
in this manner: "It focused solely on improving the financial situation of the non-custodial parent and
ignored the tax position of the custodial parent. It contained no provisions to ensure that the custodial
parent receiving payments for children would not see her personal tax burden increased, much less
share the advantageous tax treatment enjoyed by the non-custodial parent."
"o See Zweibel and Shillington, supra note 27 at 12. See also McLachlin J. in Thibaudeau atpara.
197 where she cites a survey ofjudges conducted by Judge Williams of the Nova Scotia Family Court
which found that only a minority of counsel present evidence to the court on the tax impact of child
support and the majority ofjudges do not calculate the tax consequences if no evidence is presented
to them.
I It was suggested by counsel for Revenue Canada in Thibaudeau that computer programs are
now used by lawyers in making calculations to equitably divide up the tax obligations of the "couple"
under the inclusion/deduction system. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. expressed considerable skepticism about
their usage stating that she has "serious reservations about assuming that such software, and the
expertise to use it, will be available in all cases, or even the majority of cases", supra note 10 at para.
31.
"I Ibid. atpara. 194.
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to the child." 3 In these cases women clearly receive less than required and at the same
time bearthe cost ofthe inclusion intheir income ofthe amount. The cost ofchild rearing
is therefore borne primarily by them. For those women who do not go to court but
negotiate with their ex-spouses for child support, the tax rules also present problems.
One of the most significant flaws in the current rules is that they operate on the
assumption that the parents of the child have a common interest in setting the amount
of these awards in an equitable manner in order to most benefit the child. Clearly this
assumption is not always, or indeed often, accurate. The rules apply to individuals who
have chosen to separate and given the factthatthere is frequently less than equal pooling
of income even in ongoing relationships, it is highly unrealistic to expect most ex-
spouses to share any tax subsidy. Furthermore, negotiations about the amount of child
support to be paid to the custodial parent do not take place in isolation. Frequently they
are part of ongoing negotiations or disputes about issues such as custody or property
division and this may result in trade offs being made. Perhaps even more disturbing is
that one cannot assume thatthe parties are in an equal positionwith respect to bargaining
power. It has been noted that, "Women are not infrequently pressed to bargain away
economic advantages in order to avoid legal battles over their children."'"4
Statistics show that poverty after separation or divorce is a reality for many
women.' 5 Obviously factors such as non-compliance with support orders contribute to
the poverty experienced by custodial mothers but the requirement to include support
payments in income also plays a role. The issues I have discussed raise the question of
whether the tax system is the best tool by which to achieve the policy objectives of the
inclusion/deduction system. It appears, however, that while the government is reviewing
changes to the current rules, there are no indications that it is planning to remove them
from the Act and achieve its policy objectives in another manner, such as by delivering
the subsidy directly. The mandate of the Task Force on Child Care, which was
established shortly afterthe Federal Court of Appeal rendered its decision in Thibaudeau,
was limited to receiving public input about the current tax system and suggestions for
change to that system. It did not contemplate repeal of the tax provisions.
III. APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER AFTER SYMES AND THIBAUDEAU
In this article I have illustrated numerous inequalities in the application of the tax
system to women. The next issue to be considered is what role the Charter might play
in redressing these inequalities. This issue is highly topical given that the two most recent
sex equality Charter challenges heard by the Supreme Court of Canada have been
challenges to the ACt.1 6 While the majority of the court did not recognise that the Act
discriminates on the basis of sex by denying the deduction of child care expenses as a
"I See K. Douglas, Child Support: Quantum, Enforcement and Taxation (Background Paper)
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Research Branch, November 1993) at 3.
"14 J.W. Durnford and S.J. Toope, "Spousal Support in Family Law and Alimony in the Law of
Taxation" (1994) 42 Can. Tax J. I at 28.
"5 See the discussion of this issue in Dumford and Toope, ibid. at 10-13.
16 It should be noted that while Symes argued sex discrimination, Thibaudeau argued that she
was discriminated against on the basis of family status, that is, as a single custodial parent. However,
a coalition ofintervenors in Thibaudeau, which includedthe Charter Committee on Poverty Issues, the
Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of British Columbia, the National Action Committee on the Status of
Women and the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, argued that the discrimination against
Thibaudeau was also on the basis of her sex.
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business expense (Symes) or onthe basis offamily status or sex by requiring the recipient
of child support to include those payments in income (Thibaudeau), I suggest that the
court did not foreclose the possibility of a successful Charter challenge to the Act,
although it clearly has made life difficult for potential litigants who wish to argue that
the Act discriminates on the basis of sex. In this part, I shall describe briefly these two
decisions and then discuss their relevance and application to some of the inequalities
discussed above.
In Symes the Supreme Court of Canada held that child care expenses were not
deductible under section 9 and 18(l)(a) oftheActas a business expense because section
63 of the Act already permits the deduction of a limited amount of these expenses and
that section is a complete code. The court also considered whether the denial of the
deduction infringed section 15 of the Charter because it discriminated on the basis of
sex and the majority (all the men on the court) in a decision written by Iacobucci J.
concluded that it did not. He put it this way:
[T]he appellant taxpayer has failed to demonstrate an adverse effect created or
contributed to by s. 63, although she has overwhelmingly demonstrated how the issue
of child care negatively affects women in employment terms. Unfortunately, proof that
women pay social costs is not sufficient proof that women pay child care expenses.11 7
In dissent, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. held (McLachlin J. concurring) that, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, child care expenses were deductible as a business expense under
the Act, and to deny that deduction was an infringement of the Charter. She found that
Symes "....suffers disproportionately to men and, as such, is discriminated against on the
basis of her sex. She has proven that she has incurred an actual and calculable price for
child care and that this cost is disproportionately incurred by women.""' She also found
that to deny the deduction was to discriminate against Symes on the basis of her sex.
In Thibaudeau, the Charter analysis is the entire focus of the decision and is a more
complex analysis than that in Symes. The court held by a 5-2 majority (again with the
men on the court in the majority and the women in dissent) that the requirement to
include child support payments in income did not discriminate on the basis of either sex
or family status. But, it is important to note that two ofthejudges in the majority, namely
Cory J. and lacobucci J., disassociated themselves from the decision of Gonthier J. with
respect to its section 15 analysis, preferring to adopt the reasoning of McLachlin J.
enunciated in Miron v. Trudell9 and incorporated into her dissent in Thibaudeau. In
brief, Gonthier J. applies what he describes as a comparative and contextual approach
and determines that the analysis must include a consideration of the principles offamily
law applicable to child supportpayments. In applying section 15, he uses athree step test.
First, the impugned law must make a distinction between, in this case, separated and
divorced parents and other parents. Second, if there is a distinction, then there must also
be a prejudicial effect on separated and divorced parents. Third, the distinction must be
based on irrelevant personal characteristics. Only if all three tests are met will section
15 be violated. In applying these steps Gonthier J. concludes that there is no prejudice
to the group consisting of separated and divorced parents because the inclusion/
deduction system generates a benefit forthe group, which is the subsidy discussed earlier
",7 Symes, supra note 9 at 73.
118 Ibid. at 102.
119 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No.44 (QL).
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in this article. 2 As mentioned, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. disagree with the section 15
analysis ofGonthier J. but they agree with his conclusion that there is no discrimination.
Their reason is that "[s]imply put, there is no burden."'' This conclusion echoes that of
Gonthier J. because it relies on the fact that separated and divorced couples ostensibly
enjoy a tax advantage. Cory and Iacobucci JJ. also state that:
If there is any disproportionate displacement of the tax liability between the former
spouses (as appears to be the situation befalling Ms. Thibaudeau), the responsibility for
this lies not in the Income TaxAct, but in the family law system and the procedures from
which the support orders originally flow.'2
This statement is quite perplexing. It reminds one of the "chicken and egg" analogy.
Surely without the tax rules that require the inclusion of child support payments in
income, there would be no need for family law to compensate with respect to the amount
of the orders. The problem appears, therefore, to be rooted in the tax rules and not, as
the majority suggests, merely a family law problem exacerbated by the tax rules.
A key to understanding the basis for the decision reached by the majority in
Thibaudeau is that the relevant group for the purposes of their Charter analysis was
separated or divorced couples or, as Cory and Iacobucci JJ. put it, the "post-divorce
'family unit"'.'13 In contrast, McLachlin and L' Heureux-Dub6 JJ. in dissent, focus on the
inequality between custodial and non-custodial parents. With respect to this difference
of opinion about the unit of comparison for the purposes of a section 15 analysis,
McLachlin J. states: "Where unequal treatment of one individual as compared with
another is established, it is no answer to the inequality to say that a social unit of which
the individual is a member has, viewed globally, been fairly treated." 24 Once the women
on the court find that the issue is whether custodialparents are discriminated against in
comparison to non-custodial parents, it is relatively easy for them to conclude that the
inclusion/deduction scheme is discriminatory because custodial parents incur a tax
burden while non-custodial parents receive a tax subsidy. In reaching this conclusion,
McLachlin J. notes that family law does not and cannot rectify this inequality.
The appropriate unit for the purposes of the section 15 analysis is an interesting
issue. The majority's view that the divorced or separated couple should be viewed as a
single unit is at odds with one ofthe objectives of family law, which is to promote "clean
break" or self-sufficiency of spouses after separation or divorce.' 5 While the Moge v.
Moge 26 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that this objective was only
one among others, including compensation for the economic consequence of family
120 On pp. 117-18, above. Gonthier J. also states that even though the tax saving from the
inclusion/deduction system does not benefit both parents in equal proportion, there is no infringement
of s. 15 of the Charter, Thibaudeau, supra note 10 at para. 140.
121 Thibaudeau, ibid. note 10 at par. 164.
'1 Ibid. at para. 160.
'23 Ibid. atpara. 158.
124 Ibid. atpara. 190.
M McLachlin J. discusses this issue in the context of the objectives of the inclusion/deduction
system. She says "[o]ne ofthe premises on whichthe logic ofthe deduction/inclusion scheme rests (that
custodial parents are generally subject to a lower tax rate than those who pay the child support) is less
and less in accord with present reality and undermines the importance our society places on women
attaining financial self-sufficiency", ibid. at para. 182.
126 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813,43 R.F.L. (3d) 345.
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breakdown, self-sufficiency remains a key component of support law. Treating the
divorced couple as a single unit flies in the face ofthis development. Further, if one takes
the view ofthe majorityto its logical conclusion, it appears that once a couple has a child,
they remain a couple forever. Neither separation, divorce, or even remarriage by one or
both of the parties, can dissolve the "family", at least insofar as the inclusion/deduction
rules apply to them.
I now turn, in light of Symes and Thibaudeau, to a consideration of the potential for
a successful Charter challenge to some of the inequalities I have outlined in this article.
At a general level, both Symes and Thibaudeau have confirmed that the Act is subject
to Charter review. As Iacobucci J. says in Symes, "[t]he Income TaxAct is certainly not
insulated against all forms of Charter review".' 27 Indeed, he even went as far as
suggesting the grounds for a potential Charter challenge to the Act when he said of
Symes' challenge:
In another case, a different subgroup of women with a different evidentiary focus
involving section 63 might well be able to demonstrate the adverse effects required by
subsection 15(1). For example, although I wish to express no opinion on this point, I
note that no particular effort was made in this case to establish the circumstances of
single mothers. If, for example, it could be established that women are more likely than
men to head single-parent households, one can imagine that an adverse effects analysis
involving single mothers might well take a different course, since child care expenses
would thus disproportionately fall upon women. That would be a question ofproof, and
itmightinvolveothercomplicated questions associated with the alimony and maintenance
provisions of the Income Tax Act.1
2
These comments are encouraging because they indicate that a male judge on the
Supreme Court can envisage the possibility of a successful challenge to a provision of
the Act on the basis of sex discrimination. Further, the comments of lacobucci J. focus
on a group of women who, as my previous analysis indicates, suffer considerable
discrimination under the Act.
Unfortunately, Gonthier J. in Thibaudeau muddies the waters somewhat. While
agreeing with the tenor of the comments by lacobucci J. about the relationship of the
Charter to the Act,'29 Gonthier J. then discusses the "special nature"',3 of the Act. The
question then becomes, is there something so special or different about tax legislation
that requires that it be treated differently than other legislation when the subject of a
section 15 challenge?' 3' It appears that for Gonthier J. the answer is yes. For him, the
special nature is. connected to the fact that it is the "essence of the ITA to make
17 Supra note 9 at 67.
121 Ibid. at74. Itshouldbenotedthatin Thibaudeau, thecoalition ofintervenors and SCOPEmade
this argument in support of their contention that the inclusion/deduction rules discriminated on the
basis of sex. In its decision, the Supreme Court did not directly address this issue.
129 Gonthier J. states that"....the [Act] is subject to the application ofthe Charterjust as any other
legislation is," Thibaudeau, supra note 10 at para. 90.
130 Supra note 10 at para 90.
131 The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Act is subject to Charter scrutiny. In Symes,
Iacobucci J. said "[t]he Income TaxAct is certainly not insulated against all forms of Charter review"
(supra note 9 at 67) and in Thibaudeau, Cory and Iacobucci J. state that: "As must any other
legislation, the Income Tax Act is subject to Charter scrutiny. The scope of the s. 15 right is not
dependent upon the nature of the legislation which is being challenged" (supra note 10 at para. 159).
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distinctions, so as to generate revenue for the government while equitably reconciling
a range of necessarily divergent interests"' 32 This special nature is a "significant factor
that must be taken into account in defining the scope of the right relied on, which here
as we know is the right to the 'equal benefit' of the law"' 33 Gonthier J.'s analysis is not
convincing and contradicts other Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue.'34
Attributing a special nature for section 15 purposes to legislation merely because it
makes distinctions is highly problematic. Most legislation makes distinctions and
indeed a distinction is the first step to establishing an infringement of section 15. I find
Gonthier J.'s concern about revenue raising legislation somewhat of a red herring, as the
purpose of the inclusion/deduction system is to generate a tax subsidy not revenue.
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in dissent, is clearly not persuaded that such an approach is
appropriate in a section 15 analysis. In a veiled criticism of Gonthier J's approach, she
states:
Inequality is inequality and discrimination is discrimination, whatever the legislative
source. To water down one's analysis of a legislative distinction or burden merely
because it arises in a statute which makes many other distinctions is antithetical to the
broad and purposive approach to s. 15 of the Charter which this Court has repeatedly
endorsed. 35
At this stage it is helpful to move from the general to the specific. In this article, I
have raisedmany examples ofunequal access to tax subsidies. Is itpossible, for example,
that a Charter challenge on the basis of sex discrimination to the current system of tax
assisted savings for retirement would be successful? As discussed earlier, there are
several reasons why women do not benefit as much as men from the tax preferences for
contributions to RPPs and RRSPs. 136 These include factors such as the delivery of the
subsidy as a tax deduction which is worth less to those with lower incomes, the tendency
for women to earn less than men, and women's lack of access to RPPs which are usually
only available to those who work full time. Indeed it is the interaction of these factors
that I suggest will make it difficult to argue that the effect of the tax rules is to
discriminate on the basis of sex. Three problems arise. First, the source of the inequality
becomes blurred and this makes it difficult to fashion an appropriate remedy. In this
example, the argumentwould be thatthe primary source is theAct andthe remedy sought
would presumably be either a reading down of the provisions that relate to pensions or
a reading in of a remedial measure. But, a reading down of the Act would simply result
in the elimination of the preferential tax treatment for contributions. The issue would
then be whetherthe government would step into the breach and implement a new method
of subsidising pensions. Even if the government were to take this step, it is difficult to
see how such a measure would redress the problem, given other systemic factors, such
as women's poverty and their lack of access to RPPs. It is also unclear how far a court
132 Thibaudeau, supra note 10 atpara. 91. Cory and IacobucciJJ. support GonthierJ. on this point
when they say "[w]e would stress that courts should be sensitive to the fact that intrinsic to taxation
policy is the creation of distinctions which operate, as noted by Gonthier J., to generate fiscal revenue
while equitably reconciling what are often divergent, if not competing interests"(at para. 159).
I bid. at para. 90.
'3 See discussion on pp. 122-23, above.
135 Thibaudeau, supra note 10 at para. 6.
136 See the discussion on pp. 110-12, above.
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might be prepared to go with respect to reading a remedy into the Act given that this
would have serious cost implications.
There is a second problem with respect to a Charter challenge of this nature to the
Act. Because theAct does not refer explicitly to sex, in orderto be successful, a challenge
will have to demonstrate that the current tax assisted savings system for retirement has
an adverse impact on women. Thibaudeau has created some confusion surrounding the
instance when a provision can be considered to have an adverse impact on women, and
thereby discriminate on the basis of sex. At the Federal Court of Appeal, the intervenor
SCOPE argued that the requirement to include child support in income discriminated on
the basis ofsex because it had an adverse impact on women compared to men. Hugessen
J. found that there was no sex discrimination. His reasoning was that a rule does not
discriminate on the basis of sex simply because it affects more members of one sex than
the other. If a rule which adversely affects women has the same adverse effect on men,
then even though the number of women adversely affected (98 per cent in this case) is
considerably greater than the number ofmen adversely affected (2 per cent), there is no
sex discrimination. In other words, he invoked a qualitative aspect to the test of adverse
impact discrimination. In order to succeed, women in the affected group (separated or
divorced custodial parents) hadto be affected differently than men. 37 As Professor Ellen
Zweibel has said, this interpretation "comes dangerously close to requiring a distinction
based on a sex-linked physical characteristic to establish adverse effects discrimination
based on sex. It virtually precludes linking gender-based discrimination to social or
economic status". 38 Atthe Supreme Court, the Coalition oflntervenors arguedthatthere
was also discrimination on the basis of sex and in so doing challenged this narrow
interpretation of adverse effects discrimination. Unfortunately, the majority of the
Supreme Court didnot address the argument, thereby leaving the issue ofadverse impact
discrimination unresolved.
A third problem with a sex discrimination challenge to the Act is that a court will
have to be persuaded that women's oppression in circumstances such as these is the
result of a combination of factors and, as in Thibaudeau, may be on the basis of
overlapping grounds such as sex, family status and poverty. 139 The issue of the
interaction of Chartergrounds was raisedbythe Coalition oflntervenors in Thibaudeau.
It argued that "the imposition of an additional tax liability on single mothers who are
poor exacerbates their social and economic disadvantage on the basis oftheir sex, family
status andpoverty" and that "the prevalence ofpoverty among women, and in particular
single mothers, ought to reinforce sex equality claims". 4 ' Unfortunately, the Court did
not directly address this issue in their decision, although the implication from the result
is that the Court remains committed to considering each Charter ground as a discrete
category. This approach is one of the major stumbling blocks to a successful Charter
challenge to women's inequality under the Act.
My second example of the potential application of the Charter to one of the
inequalities I have discussed is whether a challenge to the definition of spouse in theAct
117 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Philipps and Young, supra note 27 at 240-47.
138 "Constitutional Challenge", supra note 27 at 317.
13 Foran excellent discussion ofthis issue in the context of Mossop v. TreasuryBoardofCanada,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 and Symes (F.C.A.), see Iyer, supra note 28. In this article, Nitya Iyer uses the two
cases to illustrate how the categorial approach currently applied to Charter grounds is problematic.
140 Thibaudeau, paras. 38 and 40 of the Factum of the Coalition, on file with the author.
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as it applies for the purposes of private pension would be successful. Such a challenge
would be based on the ground of sexual orientation. In this case, I am more optimistic.
The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) argued before the Ontario Court,
General Division' that the definition of spouse in the Act discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation because it only applies to opposite sex couples and does not include
lesbians and gay men. 4 ' I suggest that, despite the "losses" in Symes and Thibaudeau,
the chances of success in this case are relatively good. Using the Charter analysis of
McLachlin J. as approved by Cory and Iacobucci JJ., the argument would go like this.
First the plaintiffwould show thattheAct, and specifically the definition of spouse, treats
her differently by denying the benefit of a tax deduction for contributions made by her
to a pension plan under which her same-sex partner is entitled to survivor benefits. The
second part of the argument is that this distinction is discriminatory. As McLachlin J.
says in Thibaudeau, this would include a distinction made on grounds that are typically
based on stereotypical attitudes about the characteristics or situations of the individuals
rather than their true situation or true ability. Finally, the prejudicial treatment is based
on an analogous ground, namely sexual orientation. 4 1 In Egan v. Canada,144 a case in
which a gay man argued that to deny his same sex partner the spousal allowance under
the OldAge SecurityAct contravened section 15 of the Charter and was discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court split on the issue of "spousal
benefits". Four of the judges held that there was no discrimination because lesbians and
gay men cannot be spouses in the "traditional" sense ofthat term.4 Another fourjudges
held that the legislation did discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 46 The ninth
judge on the Court, Sopinka J., held that there was discrimination, but that it wasjustified
under section 1 ofthe Charter. Thus, I suggest that in the CUPE case, it is quite possible
that the court will find that the definition of spouse in the Act does discriminate against
lesbians (and gay men) on the basis of sexual orientation and the issue will turn on
whether that discrimination is justifiable in a free and democratic society. Provided the
court does not elevate theActto a status concomitant with the "special nature" ascribed
to it by Gonthier J. in Thibaudeau, it is difficult to see how the discrimination could be
justified. 147
IV. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the impact ofthe tax system on women is truly a study in inequality. As
I have demonstrated, women do not benefit from tax subsidies to the same extent that
men benefit. Additionally, they are directlypenalisedby tax rules such as the requirement
to include child support payments in income or the limited ability to deduct child care
141 CUPE v. Minister of National Revenue, supra note 78.
42 See the discussion of this issue, on pp. 113-14, above.
143 Sexual orientation has been recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada as an analagous
ground in Egan v. Canada,[1995] S.C.R. 513, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43 (QL) [hereinafter Egan].
144 Ibid.
145 Justices Lamer, LaForest, Gonthier and Major.
146 Justices Cory, lacobucci, McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6.
147 This interpretation may be rather optimistic when one considers the comments of Sopinka J.
in Egan where he said: "Given the fact that equating same-sex couples with heterosexual spouses,
either married or common law, is still generally regarded as a novel concept, I am not prepared to say
that by its inaction to date the government disentitled itself to rely on s. I ofthe Charter." at para. I 11.
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expenses with its corresponding negative effect on their ability to participate in the paid
labour force. Underlying much of this unequal treatment is women's lack of wealth
relative to that ofmen. The result is that as long as this disparity in wealth continues and
social programs and subsidies are delivered through the tax system in their current
manner, this inequality will continue. This has led the Ontario Fair Tax Commission to
recommend that "[c]hanges should be made to the tax system to enhance progress
towards the elimination of inequities faced by women and to address provisions that
systemically discriminate against women."' 4 8 Those changes could include measures
such as converting tax deductions to tax credits, redefining "spouse" to include lesbians,
permitting a broader deduction for child care expenses and generally giving women
greater access to tax subsidies.
Suggesting changes to the tax system to redress some of the inequalities I have
discussed assumes that the tax system is the appropriate tool by which to deliver
subsidies for social and economic programs. In fact, I suggest that the tax system may
well be an inappropriate instrument by which to provide funds for matters such as child
care, old age or the support ofchildren of separated or divorced parents. A review should
be undertaken of all tax expenditures to determine whether they might be more fairly
delivered by way of a direct grant.
A theme of this article has been the (in)visibility of the inequalities suffered by
women as a result of Canadian tax policy. Ironically, while the inequalities suffered by
Symes and Thibaudeau were invisible to the Supreme Court, at least insofar as not being
found to be discriminatory, that litigation has engendered tremendous public interest
and resulted in a heightened visibility of the inequalities suffered by those women and
others. Perhaps it is time to shift our focus from a strategy that is directed towards trying
to persuade the Supreme Court that the inequalities are discriminatory and infringe our
Charter rights, and to redirect our attention to the political sphere. In so doing, we can
use the tremendous public interest in the recent litigation as a spring board to demands
for a redressing of the current inequalities.
149 Women and Taxation, supra note 57 at 47.
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